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Conscience as the Organising 
Concept of Equity
Alastair Hudson*
This article sets out a defence of the concept of equity based on conscience by tracing 
its development from the earliest cases, by establishing that a conscience is something 
objective and not subjective, and by demonstrating that the idea of conscience provides 
a coherent central principle for equitable doctrines. Equity is based on a methodology 
identified by Aristotle in his Ethics which seeks to mitigate the rigour of abstract rules, 
and also on the idea of conscience. Contrary to most of the assumptions made in the 
academic commentary on equity, a conscience is an objectively constituted phenomenon. 
This understanding of a conscience is a commonplace across our culture in sources as 
disparate as the work of Freud and Kant, in Shakespeare’s King Lear, and in Walt 
Disney’s Pinocchio. The conscience is the internal policeman which is planted in our 
minds by our interactions with the outside world. Consequently, when a court judges 
in the name of conscience, that court is holding up the individual’s behaviour to an 
objective standard. This conceptualisation of conscience and of “unconscionability” is 
shown to be the common thread running through the law on dishonest assistance, secret 
trusts, bribery, proprietary estoppel, ownership of the home and so on. The centuries-old 
arguments about the efficacy of equity turn on this understanding of a conscience and 
they can be resolved by reference to it. 
* Professor of Equity & Finance Law, University of Exeter National 
Teaching Fellow.
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I. Introduction
There has only ever been one real argument about equity. It was running in the sixteenth century and it is still running today. Either 
one considers equity to be open-textured and just, ideally suited to a 
world of constant change and unexpected challenges; or one sees it as 
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an enemy of order in the law, especially at a time when society needs 
certainty in its rules. That argument might have begun as a jurisdictional 
dispute between medieval courts, it might then have morphed into a 
dispute about whether courts of equity should have open discretion or 
operate a system of precedent, and it might then have refocused on the 
viability of the idea of “conscience” for the last four hundred years, but 
the modern arguments about constructive trusts, restitution and so forth 
are in essence that same argument in different clothing. 
This argument is said to have begun in the reign of Henry II when the 
Lord Chancellor acquired a jurisdiction beyond the Council to dispense 
judgments which began increasingly to disagree with the common law.1 
This fight for territory reached its peak when Lord Chief Justice Coke 
argued with Lord Chancellor Ellesmere about whether the judgments 
of equity should take priority over the common law. This resulted in the 
judgment in the Earl of Oxford’s Case,2 which set the foundations of an 
English equity which combined Aristotle’s model of equity with the idea 
of conscience, both of which are considered below. Subsequently, the 
argument shifted to a suspicion of the discretion which the numerous 
courts of equity3 deployed in the name of conscience. It was argued that 
the courts of equity were not bound by precedent at one time.4 Richard 
Francis began his Maxims of Equity,5 published in 1739, by confronting 
the assertion that decisions of courts of equity were “uncertain and 
precarious”6 because they were “not … bound by any established Rules 
or Orders”.7 His answer to this charge was that conscience would not 
cause judges to act arbitrarily but rather that each of those judges would 
1. See George Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery 
(London: Stevens and Norton, 1846) at 117.
2. (1615), 21 ER 485 (Ch) [Earl of Oxford]. 
3. There were several courts of equity: the Court of Chancery, the Court 
of Requests, the Court of Star Chamber and several other courts which 
dispensed equity. 
4. Mitch 31 Hen Hen VI, Fitz Abr, Subpena pl 23 (as Fortescue CJ declared 
in 1452 “[w]e are to argue conscience here, not the law”). 
5. Richard Francis, Maxims of Equity, 2d (London: Lintot, 1739). 
6. Ibid at 197.
7. Ibid.
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“be guided by that infallible Monitor within his own Breast”8 — that is, 
his conscience. Of course, to modern eyes this reads like the judges would 
be acting on the basis of their own, subjective consciences. In time, the 
argument shifted from this debate about unfettered discretion, which 
began to be resolved when Lord Chancellors like Ellesmere and Bacon 
began to consult precedents,9 to a debate about the open-textured nature 
of the idea of “conscience”. 
This essay considers the meaning of the term “conscience” in the 
context of equity. Most of the discussions of the law in this area have 
focused on a consequentialist examination of the cases in which the words 
“conscience” or “unconscionable” have been mentioned. They conclude 
correctly, that no clear definition of “conscience” is ever given by the 
judges in the cases.10 However, this leaves two stones unturned. First, the 
important understanding of a conscience as something that is “objectively 
constituted” and not entirely subjective, as most of the juristic discussions 
of conscience assume. Understanding that a conscience is something that 
is objective helps us to understand in turn that what the courts of equity 
are doing is to measure the defendant against an objective standard of 
acceptable behaviour. Second, the term “conscience” (and its technical 
corollary “unconscionable”) does not need an a priori definition from the 
courts any more than the word “reasonable” requires such a dictionary-
style definition from the common law courts. Rather, its meaning is to 
be derived from an analysis of the cases in which it has been used and by 
juristic discussion about what it should mean in the future. 
This essay advances an understanding of an objective conscience and 
8. Ibid.
9. Spence, supra note 1 at 416.
10. See e.g. the excellent surveys of the case law and the lack of any clear 
definitions in Martin Dixon, “Confining and Defining Proprietary 
Estoppel: The Role of Unconscionability” (2010) 30:3 Legal Studies 
408; Nicholas Hopkins, “Conscience, Discretion and the Creation of 
Property Rights” (2006) 26:4 Legal Studies 475; Dennis R Klinck, “The 
Unexamined ‘Conscience’ of Contemporary Canadian Equity” (2001) 
46:3 McGill Law Journal 571 [Klinck, “Unexamined Conscience”]; 
Margaret Halliwell, Equity and Good Conscience, 2d (London: Old Bailey 
Press, 2004).
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demonstrates how that is viable in modern equity. We lawyers like to tell 
our stories and we like to build our models. This is the story of equity, 
the unmerited aggression it has attracted and the way in which a little 
wooden boy chose whether to grow up straight like the golden metwand 
his conscience required, or crooked like the timber that makes up most 
of humanity.
II. Roots
A. All That Glitters is Not Golden
Lord Coke expressed a typical desire for order in the law when he said 
that “all causes should be measured by the golden and straight metwand 
of the law, and not the incertain and crooked cord of discretion”.11 In 
other words, Coke considered that English law in the 17th century 
should prefer the golden metwand of the common law to the crooked 
cord of uncertainty that was offered by equity.12 
A metwand is a measuring rod. Straight. Stiff. Accurate. Of course, it 
is useless at measuring anything which is not straight. There will always 
be a need for measuring things which are made in more intricate shapes. 
So, what sort of measure should we use if the metwand will not help 
us? Aristotle had an answer: “[a]n irregular object has a rule of irregular 
shape, like the leaden rule of Lesbian architecture: just as this rule is not 
11. Edward Coke, Fourth Institute of the Laws of England: Concerning the 
Jurisdiction of the Courts (London: Law Booksellers, 1817) at 40-41; 
Edward Coke, First Institute of the Laws of England: Commentary Upon 
Littleton (London: S Brooke Paternoster Row, 1818)(Lord Coke referred 
to “the crooked cord of private opinion, which the vulgar call discretion” 
at 227b). Again, the invective in calling equity enthusiasts “vulgar”. 
See also Keighley’s Case (1609), 10 Co Rep 139a (KB (Eng))(Lord Coke 
suggested that discretion should be “limited and bound with the rule of 
reason and law”).
12. Lord Hodson echoed that sentiment in Pettitt v Pettitt, [1970] AC 
777 (HL) at 808 (the case which ironically spawned so many different 
approaches to the ownership of the home in England and Wales based on 
common intention). 
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rigid but is adapted to the shape of the stone …”.13 Aristotle used this 
example of the Lesbian architects’ rule to explain how equity and formal 
legal rules interact. The Lesbian architects’ rule was made of a malleable 
lead which would enable stonemasons to measure the intricate coppice 
work for which the island’s workers were famous. 
This leaden rule was more useful in particular circumstances than 
straight rules, just as equitable principles can be more useful than 
common law rules in specific circumstances. Aristotle used this metaphor 
as an explanation of why equity would sometimes be “superior” to formal 
codes of justice:
equity, although just, is better than a kind of justice … it is a rectification of 
law in so far as law is defective on account of its generality. This in fact is also 
the reason why everything is not regulated by law [as opposed to equity]: it is 
because there are some cases that no law can be framed to cover, so that they 
require a special ordinance [or judgment]. An irregular object has a rule of 
irregular shape, like the leaden rule of Lesbian architecture: just as this rule 
is not rigid but is adapted to the shape of the stone, so the ordinance [or 
judgment] is framed to fit the circumstances.14 
Aristotle argued for a qualified superiority of equity over strict systems of 
formal justice because equity can tailor a remedy to meet the needs of a 
particular case whereas formal rules can only legislate for the universal case. 
It is important to note that Aristotle was aware of the tension between an 
equity which could overrule legislation and the need for formal justice. 
I have argued that this should not be an argument for the eradication 
of equity15 nor for rigid rule-making, but rather for a synthesis of these 
different types of law, as discussed below.16 For Aristotle, the two systems 
13. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by JAK Thomson (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1955) at 198 [Aristotle, Nicomachean].
14. Ibid at 200. 
15. But see Peter Birks, “Trusts Raised to Avoid Unjust Enrichment: The 
Westdeutsche Case” (1996) 4 Restitution Law Review 3; Jack Beatson, Use 
and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Peter Jaffey, 
The Nature and Scope of Restitution (Oxford: Hart, 2000)(who have argued 
for the extinguishment of equity in favour of the emerging confusions of 
English unjust enrichment thinking). 
16. Alastair Hudson, Great Debates in Equity & Trusts (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2014) at 250 [Hudson, Great Debates].
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should work together to ensure that justice is achieved for the individual. 
If the legal system is predicated on the need for justice then there does 
not need to be any conflict between these two systems of law.17 
Equity specialists simply have a different perspective from legal 
positivists on humanity and on the need to treat individuals (on some 
occasions) as being ends in themselves. Immanuel Kant said that “from 
the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made”.18 
Human beings are quixotic, irrational creatures for all their supposed 
rationality and need for order. Consequently nothing entirely ordered 
comes from them. Anyone who has practised law would acknowledge 
this. Clients can be tearful, angry, deceitful, fragile, irrational and 
indeed sometimes crooked. Family lawyers have long recognised that 
they must use high-level principles to evaluate the needs of the human 
beings who come in front of them, and then frame the remedy to fit the 
circumstances.19 Financial regulation has long since abandoned the hope 
that rigid rulebooks would deal with the non-stop movement in financial 
markets and instead have based their rulebooks on high-level principles 
which act as aids to interpretation for the more detailed regulations.20 
17. Cowper v Cowper (1734), 2 P Wms 720 (Ch (Eng))(Sir Joseph Jekyll 
explained this mutual support between these areas of law when he held 
that“[t]he discretion which is exercised here, is to be governed by the 
rules of law and equity, which are not to oppose, but each in its turn to 
be subservient to the other; this discretion, in some cases, follows the law 
implicitly, in others, assists it, and advances the remedy, in others again, it 
relieves against the abuse, or allays the rigour of it” at 752). 
18. Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a General History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose” (1894) 10 London Magazine 385 at 388 (originally published in 
1784, in proposition 6).
19. Miller v Miller, Macfarlane v Macfarlane, [2006] UKHL 24 [Miller].
20. British Bankers Association, R v The Financial Services Authority, [2011] 
EWHC 999 (QB (Admin)); see Alastair Hudson, The Law of Finance, 
2d (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 9-33 [Hudson, Finance] 
(especially the discussion of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Principles 
for Businesses Rulebook (“PRIN”) which underpins the entire regulatory 
structure in the UK: “Principles for Business” Financial Conduct 
Authority, (April 2013) online: <http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/
handbook-releases/high-level-standards136.pdf> [PRIN]).
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(Those two contexts are considered in greater detail below). Different 
types of rule-making and dispute resolution are necessary in the modern 
world. 
This is not to argue that orderly rule-making is unimportant; rather, 
it is to argue that a different form of dispute resolution will be appropriate 
in some circumstances. Consequently, Aristotle identified that no formal 
system of rules can hope to deal fairly with all of the issues which may be 
raised. The question is how well equity can fill that gap. 
For this limited and entirely moral Aristotelian ambition, the 
existence of equity as a distinct stream of law in England has always 
enraged those common lawyers who see it as being subversive of the need 
for good order in legal rules. Its incremental development of principles 
and the supposed discretion of its judges was said to threaten the order 
which the common law sought to create. In giving judgment, Chief 
Justice Hale said that “[b]y the growth of equity on equity the heart of 
the common law is eaten out”.21 That is quite a charge. Indeed that sort of 
unnecessarily bitter invective continues in the modern discussion. Birks 
infamously described people who were prepared to allow conscience to 
underpin an area of law as being akin to the vile Nazi Heydrich, architect 
of the Final Solution and thereby the Holocaust, who expressed himself 
as being able to reconcile his evil with his conscience. While Birks may 
have claimed he was merely showing that all involved were falling into 
the same mistake as Heydrich, the metaphor is deeply unpleasant.22 All 
of this invective is all the more remarkable given that the principal goal 
of equity specialists is to work sensitively so as to prevent unconscionable 
advantage being taken of claimants and so as to achieve just results in 
particular cases. 
21. Rosecarrick v Barton (1672), 1 Cha Cas 217 (Ch (Eng)) at 219. 
22. Birks, supra note 15 at 20. For a counter-blast to this unpleasant line of 
argument see Hudson, Great Debates, supra note 16 at 64; Steve Hedley, 
“The Taxonomy of Restitution”, in Alastair Hudson, ed, New Perspectives 
on Property Law, Obligations and Restitution (London: Cavendish, 2004) 
at 151 [Hedley, “Taxonomy”] (both marvel at the use of the holocaust to 
cause such a weak debating point, as though arguing for a constructive 
trust were equivalent to arguing for genocide). 
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It has been suggested that judges like Lord Browne-Wilkinson have 
“discovered” the idea of conscience in England and Wales only in the 
mid-1990s. The response to that suggestion is threefold. First, those 
commentators simply failed to notice that judges like Vice-Chancellor 
Megarry in Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts,23 Mr Justice Scott in Attorney 
General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) 24 (“Spycatcher”) and others 
always used the idea of “conscience” in their judgments. Second, English 
law was turned on its head by the open-textured juristic imagination 
of Lord Denning which brought so many equitable ideas with it. In 
the 1980s, the courts determinedly dismantled many of his ideas like 
estoppel licences, the new model constructive trust and the married 
woman’s equity.25 Consequently, that sort of discretionary talk became 
unfashionable.26 When this demolition work was finished, it became 
possible for the conscionable brickwork of equity to be seen again. Third, 
in an increasingly complex world, we retreat into examinations of our 
values and of our principles. In essence, we return to our roots. 
B. The Intellectual Roots of Equity
There are two intellectual roots to equity which are significant. The 
first is Aristotle’s Ethics.27 For Aristotle, equity is “superior to justice” 
in the sense that it allows decisions to be reached in individual cases 
23. [1987] Ch 264 (Eng) [Montagu’s].
24. [1990] AC 109 (HL) [Spycatcher].
25. For the attitude underpinning the former see e.g. Eves v Eves, [1975] 3 All 
ER 768 (CA)(where Lord Denning warned us that “[e]quity is not past 
the age of child-bearing” at 771); and for an example of the latter see cases 
like Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold, [1989] 1 Ch (CA (Eng))(which took those 
developments apart). 
26. Allen v Snyder, [1977] 2 NSWLR 685 (CA (Austl))(the Australian 
courts were equally suspicious of it, considering that Denning’s equitable 
developments were to be considered to be “a mutant from which further 
breeding should be discouraged” at 701).
27. Very similar accounts of equity as it related to Aristotle’s four-tiered 
model of justice appear in Aristotle, Nicomachean, supra note 13; and in 
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, translated by Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 71.
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which correct “errors” made by legislators when creating general rules in 
legislation (“for all law is universal”)28 which did not anticipate individual 
injustices which might result in their application. Importantly, however, 
Aristotle explained that equity is also supportive of formal justice (such 
as statute) in essence because both streams of law are intended to generate 
justice. Ashburner in his Principles of Equity suggested that “[e]quity is 
a word which has been borrowed by law from morality, and which has 
acquired in law a strictly technical meaning”;29 and in the first footnote 
accompanying that opening remark that “[t]ext writers and judges in 
the time of Elizabeth, when they are dealing with the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Chancery, often define equity in terms translated from 
Aristotle”,30 which was an idea he took in turn from Spence and which 
is evident from judgments of the period.31 Lord Ellesmere, the Lord 
Chancellor, held as follows in the Earl of Oxford’s Case, in describing the 
purpose of the Court of Chancery: “[t]he cause why there is a Chancery 
is, for that men’s actions are so divers and infinite, that it is impossible 
to make any general law which may aptly meet with every particular act, 
and not fail in some circumstances”.32 Self-evidently, his Lordship was 
echoing Aristotle’s ideas very closely in that equity exists in part to meet 
circumstances in which the general rules of common law fail to provide 
just outcomes. 
The second root of equity is the specifically conscience-based 
equity which was developed in England. The concept of conscience was 
established in this area by the time of the judgment of Lord Ellesmere 
in that same case when he explained that “[t]he office of the Chancellor 
is to correct men’s consciences for frauds, breach of trusts, wrongs and 
oppressions, of what nature soever they be, and to soften and mollify the 
extremity of the law …”.33 Thus conscience is already considered to be 
28. Aristotle, Nicomachean, supra note 13.
29. Denis Browne, Ashburner’s Principles of Equity, 2d (London: William 
Clowes and Sons, 1933) at 3.
30. Ibid.
31. Spence, supra note 1 at 412. 
32. Earl of Oxford, supra note 2.
33. Ibid. 
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at the heart of English equity. We shall consider the idea of conscience 
in greater detail below. We shall identify: first, the significance of its use 
by Lord Chancellors who were clerics tending the monarch’s conscience; 
second, the significance of those clerics addressing the impure consciences 
of people who had committed frauds; third, the significance of the court 
“correcting” someone’s conscience according to an objective idea of what 
that conscience ought to contain; and, fourth, the significance of the 
Court of Chancery interfering only when there have been unconscionable 
wrongs committed which the common law cannot prevent. 
C. The Sublime Conscience
The Lord Chancellors (until the appointment of Lord Keeper Williams 
at the beginning of the 17th century) had all been ecclesiastics.34 
Therefore, the language of a sublime conscience in which they spoke, as 
bishops in the Christian church, who ministered and administered the 
monarch’s conscience, came naturally to them when making judgment. 
They “ministered” in the sense of acting as priests and as de facto “prime 
minister” to the monarch. They “administered” in the sense of running 
the Chancery which issued writs on behalf of the Crown, and latterly 
running the Courts of Chancery and of Star Chamber. 
Nevertheless, in all of this there remains a very important root for the 
modern, psychological notion of a conscience. The Lord Chancellor was 
often referred to as being the “keeper” of the monarch’s conscience, which 
suggested that the conscience was something distinct from the monarch 
as a person.35 As sovereign, the King or Queen had divinely-bestowed 
royal duties as well as a corporeal self. Therefore, the conscience that 
was activated through the Courts of Chancery was an expression of this 
monarchical power. When we consider the psychological understandings 
of a conscience today, we shall see that this separateness of the conscience 
from the conscious mind of the individual human being is central to its 
operation. 
34. Geraint W Thomas, “James I, Equity and Lord Keeper John Williams” 
(1976) 91 English Historical Review 506.
35. Spence, supra note 1 (as Sir Christopher Hatton said, it is “the holy 
conscience of the Queen, for matter of equity” at 414). 
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Fascinatingly, Ashburner explained the operation of conscience in 
the 16th century as involving the court helping the defendant to purge 
themselves of a bad conscience because the conscience was the voice of 
God singing in the individual’s head. So, it was said that “from the canon 
law equity derived its power of wringing a confession on oath from the 
conscience of the defendant”.36 Equity was not above using irons or 
whips at that time. 
So, we can identify the roots of equity in this ancient soil. What this 
does not do is to take us to the heart of what a modern conscience might 
involve. It is to that task which we turn next. 
III. Conscience and “Unconscionability”
A. The Argument
Whenever I read an account of equity or of conscience written by a legal 
academic, I assume that they will turn to define the word “conscience” 
in its colloquial or psychological sense. Aside from the excellent Young, 
Croft and Smith’s On Equity37 or my own work,38 they never do. I am 
always surprised because it seems to me that many of their concerns about 
the term “conscience” being uncertain or amorphous could be resolved 
if they did so. 
By way of an excellent example of a scholarly analysis of these 
concepts in the cases, Dixon39 criticised the waxing and waning of the 
term “unconscionability” in the doctrine of proprietary estoppel in 
the wake of the decisions in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe40 
(“Cobbe”)(in which Lord Scott appeared to limit the doctrine greatly) and 
36. Browne, supra note 29. 
37. Peter Young, Clyde Croft & Megan L Smith, On Equity (Pyrmont: 
Thomson Reuters, 2009) at 105. 
38. See e.g. Alastair Hudson, Equity & Trusts, 8d (London: Routledge, 2014), 
s 37.2.
39. Martin Dixon, “Confining and Defining Proprietary Estoppel: the Role of 
Unconscionability” (2010) 30:3 Legal Studies 408.
40. [2008] UKHL 55.
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Thorner v Major41 (in which Lord Walker and Lord Rodger opened it out 
again) by demonstrating that the doctrine of unconscionability was never 
clearly defined. Dixon also identified Lord Walker’s odd abandonment 
of the idea of unconscionability in Cobbe after having advanced it so 
clearly in Jennings v Rice.42 His focus is not on defining what is meant 
by conscience. The same is true of Hopkins43 and Klinck,44 who both 
model the different approaches taken in different cases where judges have 
mentioned the concept of unconscionability. 
What this commentary does not do is to define the meaning of 
conscience nor does it explain how such a concept underpins the 
important work that equity does. It is that project which is undertaken 
here. 
In essence, the point which is advanced here is that a conscience is 
objectively constituted and that the courts are therefore judging what 
should have been in that conscience. As Lord Justice Chadwick held 
“[t]he enquiry is not whether the conscience of the party who has 
obtained the benefit … is affected in fact; the enquiry is whether, in 
the view of the court, it ought ‘to be’.45 This is the point: the courts are 
measuring what a person ought to have thought, what their conscience 
ought to have prompted them to do. The court is able to do that because 
the court stands for an objective statement of the values which should 
have been input to a person’s conscience. Klinck argues that ‘conscience’ 
in equity is not co-extensive with moral conscience”,46 but one has to ask 
“why not?” If Klinck means that the legal model of conscience cannot be 
involved with every minor moral imperfection (such as untrue answers 
to the questions “have you washed your hands?” or “do you really love 
me?”), then that is sensible. The legal conscience of equity is to be reserved 
41. [2009] UKHL 18.
42. [2002] EWCA Civ 159 [Jennings].
43. Nicholas Hopkins, “Conscience, Discretion and the Creation of Property 
Rights” (2006) 26:4 Legal Studies 475.
44. Klinck, “Unexamined Conscience”, supra note 10. 
45. Jones v Morgan, [2001] EWCA Civ 995 at para 35.
46. Dennis R Klinck, “The Nebulous Equitable Duty of Conscience” (2005) 
31:1 Queen’s Law Journal 206 at 212 [Klinck, “Nebulous”].
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for imperfections which the courts consider to be sufficiently serious to 
warrant their attention. Otherwise, equity has always been wrapped up 
with general questions of morality framed in legal terms, as we shall see. 
B. From “Unconscionability” to Conscience
The term “unconscionability” is a term of art. If we want to know 
what unconscionability means in a particular sense then we have 
only to examine the most recent case in the applicable jurisdiction 
on the most relevant equitable principle. For example, the concept of 
“unconscionability” in relation to liability for knowing receipt is defined 
in part by the judgment of Lord Justice Nourse, who found in Bank of 
Credit & Commerce International v Akindele 47 that “unconscionability” 
did not encompass the actions of a person who could not have known that 
his financial advisors were breaching their fiduciary duties by overpaying 
him on his investments.48 Not investigating something which one could 
not have found out easily will not be considered to be unconscionable, 
as in Re Montagu’s Settlement,49 such that forgetting the terms of a trust 
prevented liability being imposed on a beneficiary who had absent-
mindedly put the pick of the trust fund up for sale at auction. These 
cases help us to know what “unconscionability” means in this area. This 
may smack of casuistry; or, as moral philosophers would prefer to call it, 
consequentialism. Nevertheless, this is the way in which common law 
systems define terms of this sort. 
Sometimes these consequentialist definitions are surprising. We 
know from the judgment of Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps50 that a 
defendant may be required to hold personal profits on constructive trust 
for the beneficiaries of a trust which he was advising as their solicitor, 
even though it was considered that he had a conscience “completely 
innocent in every way”.51 His actions were nevertheless considered by the 
majority of the House of Lords to have infringed a central requirement 
47. [2000] 4 All ER 221 (CA).
48. Ibid at 238.
49. Montagu’s, supra note 23. 
50. [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL).
51. Ibid at 123. 
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of equity that a fiduciary must not benefit from a conflict of interest. 
That is, his actions were considered to be unconscionable in a technical 
sense because it is unconscionable for a fiduciary to permit a conflict of 
interest. This is not a general moral question, rather, it is a legal question. 
A general moral analysis might lead us to the supposition that a person 
who risked their own money, as a result of their own extensive research 
and skill, so as to make profits for themselves and other people should 
be entitled to keep those profits. By contrast, English equity finds that 
because that person was a fiduciary at the time, they are required to hold 
those profits on constructive trust. The unconscionability in the technical 
sense of that term is based on a fiduciary permitting a conflict of interest 
to occur.52 Of course, another approach to the moral question might 
be to say: the defendant was a solicitor who had studied English trusts 
law and who therefore ought to have known that he was not entitled to 
take profits for himself from a trust to which he was giving legal advice 
without authorisation to do so, and therefore that a constructive trust 
was entirely appropriate. 
The point is that the concept of what constitutes unconscionable 
behaviour in legal terms is defined in part by a line of authority, just as 
a section of hedge helps to define the perimeter of a field. The field is 
defined by the accumulation of those sections of plant that grow into 
a complete hedge. The shape of the field can move by the addition 
or removal of hedging material. In the same way, what is meant by 
the technical concept of unconscionability is defined by the shifting 
topography of case law. 
So, if we want to know what unconscionability means in general 
terms then we have only to conduct a survey of the most recent binding 
52. Bray v Ford, [1896] AC 44 (HL), per Lord Herschell (“[i]t is an inflexible 
rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position … is not 
allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict” 
at 50). 
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precedents across that field covered by the equity textbooks.53 It is 
not unknowable simply because the field is large. It is very knowable 
indeed. In many circumstances, it is possible to use external statements of 
appropriate behaviour (especially where there is a regulatory code binding 
on the defendant) to provide a yardstick for unconscionable behaviour in 
particular contexts.54
C. Defining “Conscience”
By contrast, the idea of a conscience is a different question. Many 
commentators choose not to think about a conscience at all or they fail 
to answer their own question. However, the conscience is not something 
which is entirely subjective. Rather, as a psychological phenomenon, it 
is experienced subjectively by the individual but in truth it is formulated 
from objective elements. This is self-evident simply from an examination 
of the literal meaning of the English word “conscience”.
The etymology of the English word “conscience” is a combination 
of the word “con”, meaning “with”, and the word “science”, meaning 
“knowledge”. This idea of “knowledge with” comes from the ancient 
Greek “suneidenai” and refers to a person having “knowledge of oneself 
with oneself ”. In particular, the root of the Greek word suggested 
specifically “sharing knowledge of a defect held with oneself ”.55 Here the 
individual has two separate components in their conscious mind: their 
conscious self and their conscience, which share knowledge of a defect 
together. Significantly, conscience is not simply subjective knowledge 
of oneself, but rather it recognises the existence of a conscious self and 
53. This is a field in which there are many colossal textbooks (intended 
for practitioners and for students). See e.g. Klinck, “Unexamined 
Conscience”, supra note 10; Klinck, “Nebulous”, supra note 46 (Professor 
Klinck’s encyclopaedic articles in the area illustrate quite how many cases 
there are in English and in Canadian law which have used the terms 
“conscience” and its derivatives). 
54. Alastair Hudson, “The Synthesis of Public and Private in Finance Law”, in 
Kit Barker & Darryn Jansen, eds, Private Law: Key Encounters with Public 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 231-64.
55. Richard Sorabji, Moral Conscience Through The Ages (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) at 12.
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another self within one’s mind. It is also suggested that a conscience at the 
time of the ancient Greeks pre-supposed the existence of a law which was 
being broken so that a defect would come to light.56 
D. The Conscience as an Objective Phenomenon
1. Conscience in the Psychological Literature
The principal error into which most commentators fall when talking about 
conscience is in treating it as being an entirely subjective phenomenon 
which exists solely in the individual human’s mind (so that there are 
seven billion entirely unique consciences in the world). In truth, the 
conscience exists outside the conscious mind in that there is no possibility 
of conscious control over it by the rational mind, as was suggested by the 
etymology of the word “conscience” above. Sigmund Freud explained the 
creation of the conscience as a psychological phenomenon in Civilisation 
and Its Discontents57 in the following way:
a portion of the ego [sets] itself up as the super-ego in opposition to the rest [of 
the psyche], and is now prepared, as “conscience”, to exercise the same severe 
aggression against the ego that the latter would have liked to direct towards 
other individuals. The tension between the stern super-ego and the ego that is 
subject to it is what we call a “sense of guilt”; this manifests itself as a need for 
punishment.58 
Thus, the conscience is assembled inside the mind with inputs from 
outside that individual mind. During infancy those messages come from 
parents and other family members; during childhood they also come 
from schoolteachers and others; and then during adulthood there is the 
legal system, the media and so forth all directing different inputs to the 
individual’s mind.59 Kant explains conscience in the following way:
[e]very human being has a conscience and finds himself observed, threatened, 
and, in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge; 
and this authority watching over the law in him is not something that he 
himself (voluntarily) makes, but something incorporated into his being. It 
56. Ibid. 
57. Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1930)
58. Ibid at 77.
59. Norbert Elias, The Society of Individuals (London: Continuum, 2001).
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follows him like his shadow … 60 
The Kantian model captures the same aggression that Freud identified: 
the conscience bites and it threatens.61 The result is a conscience which 
contains an aggregation of individual responses to those social messages. 
The upshot is that our culture frequently presents the conscience as being 
something that is not only objectively constituted but which also exists 
entirely outside the conscious human mind. 
2. The Ubiquity of the Externalised Conscience in Our 
Culture
Our literature and popular culture teem with examples of this sort 
of externalised conscience. In Shakespeare’s King Lear, the Fool acts 
as conscience to the King and not simply as a capering amusement. 
Significantly he tells inconvenient truths to the King with the unbridled 
insolence of a conscience. The King’s descent into madness comes when, 
importantly, he banishes his Fool. This was a frequent trope of European 
theatre: the capering fool as conscience, idiot savant and truth-teller. 
Perhaps the clearest explanation of the external conscience comes 
from Walt Disney’s Pinocchio. You may be familiar with the story but 
you may have forgotten how important the idea of conscience was to the 
Disney version of the story.62 Pinocchio was a little wooden boy crafted 
by Geppetto who came magically to life thanks to a visiting Blue Fairy 
who wanted to reward Geppetto for his good works. However, the Blue 
Fairy realised that Pinocchio would lack a conscience and therefore could 
60. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) at 189.
61. The Anglo-Saxon expression the “Agonbyt of Inwyt” captures this: 
literally, the agonising bite of internal wit; or, a pang of conscience. The 
original metaphor of a “bite” is more visceral than the modern “pang” 
which suggests something slight. 
62. The story of Pinocchio is based on Carlo Collodi’s Le Avventure di 
Pinocchio first published in 1881 which was intended to be a warning 
to children. The character of Jiminy Cricket was a characteristic 
anthropomorphic development in the Disney version of the story which 
enlarged a cricket into a talking conscience, complete with top hat, 
umbrella and spats. 
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not be a real boy. Consequently, Jiminy Cricket is elevated by the Blue 
Fairy specifically to act as Pinocchio’s conscience. It was the addition of 
Jiminy Cricket to his psyche that was essential in turning Pinocchio into 
“a real boy”. Jiminy Cricket is a literal, external conscience.
Fascinatingly, the Fairy explains to Pinocchio at the outset that 
having a conscience, and thus proving himself to be worthy of becoming 
a real boy, requires that he be “brave, truthful and unselfish”. The point is 
that the Fairy stipulates from the outset what the contents of Pinocchio’s 
conscience should be. The contents of his conscience are dictated from 
outside himself, just like the psychological model of a conscience. 
Pinocchio does not decide for himself subjectively what is in good and 
bad conscience. Instead, Pinocchio misbehaves and his conscience (in 
the form of Jiminy Cricket) reproves him for it, and ultimately saves him 
from being transformed into a “jackass”. As Pinocchio puts it: “[h]e’s my 
conscience. He tells me what’s right and wrong”.63 
The point is that the conscience in equity is an objectively constituted 
conscience: the question for the court is what a person’s conscience ought 
to have told them to do.64 The court is not asking the defendant what 
they personally claim to think is right or wrong. Instead, the court is 
asking what that person’s conscience, formed by inter-action with that 
society, ought to have prompted them to do. 
E. The Objective Conscience at Work: Dishonest 
Assistance
A good example of an objective form of unconscionability at work is the 
concept of “dishonesty” established in the Privy Council in Royal Brunei 
Airlines v Tan.65 Lord Nicholls held that the concept of dishonesty was 
63. This causes Lampwick to ask: “What? You mean you take orders from a 
grasshopper?”.
64. The same point can be made by reference to the philosophy of aesthetics 
presented by Adorno whereby the appreciation of art is said to be 
objectively constituted (by the receipt of messages about what constitutes 
real art) and yet to be subjectively situated (in that one appreciated art 
within one’s own mind): see Hudson, Great Debates, supra note 16 at 17. 
65. [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC (Brunei)) [Royal Brunei].
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not a subjective one but rather an assessment by the judge of what an 
honest person would have done in the circumstances: “acting dishonestly, 
or with a lack of probity, which is synonymous, means simply not acting 
as an honest person would in the circumstance. This is an objective 
standard”.66 So, a defendant was not dishonest because subjectively they 
believed themselves to be dishonest but rather because that person had 
failed to do what an objectively honest person would have done in the 
circumstances. As with conscience, society through the agency of the 
judge is deciding what an honest person should do. 
The criminal law specialist, Lord Hutton, could not let go of the 
criminal standard of dishonesty in Twinsectra Limited v Yardley67 in the 
House of Lords. Consequently, he held that dishonesty must involve both 
a failure to act as an honest person would have acted in the circumstances 
and also an appreciation on the defendant’s part that honest people 
would have considered their behaviour to have been dishonest. It is this 
latter subjective element which characterises the criminal law approach. 
Importantly, it is precisely this latter element which was disavowed by the 
Privy Council in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International 
Ltd 68 because it made it too easy for a defendant to argue that his personal 
moral code permitted him to do the thing which the common morality 
would have considered dishonest. In that case, the defendant turned a 
blind eye to the source of the funds which he was being asked to pay 
through his small fund in the Isle of Man while claiming that his personal 
moral code prevented him from cross-questioning a client as to the source 
of his funds. So, equity here does not allow subjective moral relativism. 
Rather, it deals only in objective standards. 
This objective approach in the case law has not been without its 
problems. Most of those problems have come from a determination 
among the judges to see dishonesty as involving some level of subjectivity. 
Lord Nicholls held that “[t]he court will also have regard to personal 
attributes of the third party such as his experience and intelligence, and 
66. Ibid at 381.
67. [2002] UKHL 12 [Twinsectra].
68. [2005] UKPC 37 (Isle of Man) at para 12. 
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the reason why he acted as he did”.69 This single sentence in a twelve 
page judgment which otherwise advances purely objective tests has been 
relied upon by numerous judges to justify taking into account a range of 
subjective factors about the defendant70 ranging from their educational 
lack of attainment,71 their lack of experience,72 through to the stigma 
that would attach to their professional reputation if they were found 
to be dishonest.73 By way of example, in Markel International Insurance 
Company Ltd v Surety Guarantee Consultants Ltd 74 Mr Justice Toulson 
spent several pages of his judgment examining the subjective situation 
of the defendant when supposedly applying an objective test. If the test 
had been entirely objective, then his Lordship would have been better 
directed to ignore those dozen pages of the defendant’s personal history 
in favour of an assessment of what an honest person would have done in 
those circumstances. 
The model suggested by Lord Nicholls demonstrates how an objective 
concept can work. The court has no interest in the defendant’s personal 
beliefs, except to the extent that the circumstances in which the defendant 
found themselves shed light on the way in which an objectively honest 
person might behave. There is an issue about whether or not this concept 
of dishonesty actually equates to unconscionability at all. Lord Nicholls 
was at pains to point out that his test drew on the decision of Lord Selborne 
in Barnes v Addy75 to the effect that the defendant must be dishonest and 
that it did not involve a general concept of unconscionability. And yet, 
this approach puts this area of law generally in line with other equitable 
doctrines which are concerned with the conscience of the defendant, 
whether that be as a result of theft, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or, in 
this instance, dishonesty. 
69. Royal Brunei, supra note 65 at 391.
70. Starglade v Nash, [2010] EWCA Civ 1314. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Manolakaki v Constantinides, [2004] EWHC 749 (Ch); Markel 
International Insurance Co Ltd v Surety Guarantee Consultants Ltd, [2008] 
EWHC 1135 (QB (Comm)).
73. Twinsectra, supra note 67 at 387 (per Lord Hutton). 
74. [2008] EWHC 1135 (QB (Comm)). 
75. (1874), LR 9 Ch App 244 (CA (Eng)).
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E. Equity as a Methodology
Equity is a way of thinking as much as anything. For Aristotle it was a 
means of creating just outcomes from the application of limited formal 
rules. More generally, equity is one of those areas of law which uses high-
level principles as moral precepts and aids to interpretation of more 
detailed rules. Thus, the idea of conscience supports the imposition of 
constructive trusts over people who acquire property from a trust by 
fraud both by reference to the general moral question of good conscience 
and as to the detailed case law, for example, on tracing property rights or 
the imposition of proprietary constructive trusts.76 However, if we think 
of equity as being a methodology — using both general principles to 
guide decision-making and detailed rules developed as part of a doctrine 
of precedent — then we can identify different (even purer) forms of 
equity in other legal fields. Two examples are family law and finance law. 
In UK finance law77 there is a combination of financial regulation 
(created further to EU and UK statute by statutory regulatory bodies) 
and of ordinary substantive law (both case law and statutory principles 
relating to contract, tort, property, trust and so forth).78 UK financial 
regulation is predicated on the Principles for Businesses Rulebook 
(“PRIN”) which is used as a means of interpreting all of the thousands 
76. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Council of the London Borough 
of Islington, [1996] AC 669 (HL) [Westdeutsche].
77. It is appropriate to talk of UK finance law because so many of its 
regulations are created as part of EU law and therefore the UK is the 
appropriate jurisdiction. However, when one considers the general law 
of contract, property and so forth, then there are different jurisdictions 
within the UK: England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. In 
dealing with academic colleagues in Australia and in Canada, the effect of 
the presence of the European Union (like that of an enormous orbiting 
moon with a strong gravitational pull) is something which is difficult to 
explain. For example, there are few cases on unit trusts in the UK on the 
basis of trusts law because unit trusts are now regulated by the Financial 
Conduct Authority with its cheap, comparatively efficient Financial 
Services Ombudsman scheme. 
78. See generally Hudson, Finance, supra note 20 ch 3 (for an explanation of 
the structure). 
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of more detailed regulations in the Financial Conduct Authority and 
Prudential Regulation Authority “Handbooks”.79 The first principle in 
PRIN is the requirement that every regulated person act with “integrity”. 
This requirement has been used by the regulatory authorities to impose 
fines on financial institutions where their behaviour has fallen below 
the standards expected of them, for example in relation to fixing the 
important Libor interest rate. Interestingly, this general standard of 
integrity has been used as the justification for the fine and not more 
detailed regulations in other parts of the Handbook which had also been 
breached. This is a form of equity in that a general moral standard is 
being used to underpin and to apply detailed rules. 
Similarly in family law there is a methodology of using high-level 
principles which are applied to individual cases in a way that is sensitive 
to context and which observes the rule of precedent after a fashion as a 
guide to the interpretation of those high-level principles. So, this equity-
like methodology is a way of taking a high-level principle and applying 
it to the needs and circumstances of a particular family group in a way 
that is both principled and yet sensitive to context. By way of example, 
Baroness Hale and Lord Nicholls held in the joined appeals of Miller v 
Miller and Macfarlane v Macfarlane that applications for ancillary relief 
required the court to consider the needs of the family members, equal 
sharing of matrimonial property and family assets, and compensation.80 
This decision (in turn following the earlier decision of the House of 
Lords in White v White)81 creates a means for lower courts to interpret 
the general principles applying to ancillary relief proceedings both by 
establishing general principles and by adding a gloss to earlier general 
principles. The way in which family law observes precedent is to see the 
law as being comprised of high-level principles with guidelines set out 
in the cases as to their application, as opposed to seeing the law as being 
79. PRIN, supra note 20; the unfortunately named “Handbooks” contain 
both the regulatory “Rules” and the “Guidance” governing regulated 
persons: “Financial Conduct Authority Handbook” Financial Conduct 
Authority, online: < https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk>.
80. Miller, supra note 19.
81. [2001] 1 AC 596 (HL). 
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comprised of hard-and-fast rules.
The purest form of the use of equitable technique in English law may 
be family law. Section 1 of the Children Act 1989,82 for example, provides 
that the welfare of the child is paramount. This statutory principle creates 
a high-level, central principle but one which is developed in the case 
law in a way that some moral philosophers would describe as being 
“consequentialist”: that is, by developing the meaning of that principle 
through successive cases. That there is a central principle would be 
described by other moral philosophers as being part of a “deontological” 
method: that is, where a central moral principle is established which 
governs all decision-making. Common law systems do both things: 
they develop their principles consequentially from case-to-case, and 
they also observe rules and principles which were set out in earlier cases. 
Equity does not operate as a completely deontological project because its 
principles are developed through cases: for example, a rule concerning 
bribery arises only once a case on bribery appears, and so on. Nor is 
equity completely consequentialist because it has its general principles 
of “conscience” to guide it, and because the courts intermittently state or 
re-state its core principles. 
These two methodologies — the consequentialist and the 
deontological — slip over one another like wet crabs in a basket in the 
equitable context. Equity uses high-level principles and precedents on 
the interpretation and meaning of those principles, and their application 
to individual cases, to achieve its goal of mitigating the rigour of the 
common law and correcting people’s consciences. Equity is thus a 
methodology in itself. 
E. Discretion in Equity
Much of the foregoing and on-going debate about equity revolves around 
a supposed binary division between “discretion” and “no discretion”. It is 
supposed that “discretion” is bad because it permits judges to do whatever 
they want and in consequence it is presumed that the law is rendered 
unpredictable and chaotic. By contrast, “no discretion” assumes a series 
82. (UK), c 41, s 1.
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of carefully crafted taxonomic categories which present order and good 
sense: something which is not necessarily apparent in the English law of 
negligence, for example. 
Of course, the courts do neither thing. Instead, the English courts 
have always applied a form of “weak discretion” in their use of equity. 
A strong discretion would involve the courts in making any decision 
that they saw fit. The model of strong discretion which was feared by 
Lord Eldon and judges of a similar ilk was a form of discretion in which 
the courts of equity were simply doing whatever they thought “right” in 
the abstract, perhaps by reference to general ethical principles expressed 
through the maxims of equity as drawn together by Francis and others.83 
This accompanied the debates about whether or not equity was governed 
by a doctrine of precedent at all. English courts have always been reluctant 
to do this. There are many examples of the English courts diluting any 
ostensibly strong discretion they may have. Where the courts were given 
the power by statute to grant injunctions whenever they considered it to 
be just and equitable, the Court of Appeal in Jaggard v Sawyer84 set out 
limitations on the way in which those statutory powers would be used 
by the courts in practice, and each court continues to abide by those 
probanda. 
A weaker form of discretion is still possible under the Aristotelian 
model: that is, the correction of the application of formal legal rules in 
particular cases in line with precedent and in line with clear principles 
setting out the way in which deviation from those formal legal rules is 
possible. A good example of this phenomenon is the law on secret trusts 
in England. The general principle is that a person may not knowingly 
act in a way which ought to have affected their conscience.85 The case 
law precedent has clearly established that it is contrary to conscience, for 
example, for a person to agree to take property under a friend’s will (on the 
understanding that they will apply that property for the maintenance of 
83. Francis, supra note 5; Edmund Snell, Equity (reprint of the 1838 edition)
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000)(both used the approach of beginning 
with ancient equitable maxims and then linking them to decided cases).
84. [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA (Civ)(Eng)). 
85. Westdeutsche, supra note 76. 
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the testator’s illegitimate child) and then to purport to take that property 
beneficially because no living person knows of the arrangement.86 This 
line of cases, establishing the principle known as “secrets trusts”, offends 
the provisions of section 9 of the Wills Act 183787 that a bequest in a will 
is only valid if it complies with the formalities set out in that statute, and 
moreover that a formally valid will may not be circumvented by parol 
evidence. However, the “friend” in this example would clearly be acting 
unethically in knowingly taking property not intended for them and 
would be causing harm to the child who was intended to be maintained 
by that property. Presumably the child’s mother would be the one to 
propel the matter to court in practice. It is a clear example of Aristotle’s 
equity that prompts a judge to prevent this unconscionable benefit being 
taken from the bequest: the statute did not anticipate this self-evident 
wrong and therefore the judge ought, on Aristotle’s model, to correct the 
legislator’s shortcomings in failing to anticipate that scenario. Assuming 
the matter comes up to proof, then an English judge would be acting in 
accordance with precedent in finding that there was a “secret trust” in 
existence. The approach taken in the case law is a weak discretion, even 
though it contravenes the Wills Act 1837, because it is an example of 
an unconscionable act which will invoke the creation of a trust which 
has been established by precedent and which prompts the judge to 
circumvent the statutory formalities when the authorities permit them 
to do so. Moreover, the judges only make their finding of a secret trust if 
the facts are clear and the requirements set out in earlier cases satisfied. 
Another interesting example of discretion in English law is proprietary 
estoppel. At the time of writing, proprietary estoppel is the closest that 
English equity comes to a remedial constructive trust. Indeed, a part of the 
reason for there being less of a clamour for a remedial constructive trust 
in English law is twofold. First, the constructive trust is divided into well-
established categories which operated institutionally in quite predictable 
ways. That is, the constructive trust comes into existence automatically 
86. The case law in this area can be traced back at least to Sellack v Harris 
(1708), 2 Eq Ca Ab 46 (Eng) through McCormick v Grogan (1869), LR 4 
HL 82. 
87. (UK), c 26, s 9.
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at the time when the defendant’s conscience is said to have been affected 
by the matter which ought to have affected their conscience. As the 
House of Lords in Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington88 (“Westdeutsche”) 
accepted, seemingly unanimously on this point, the requirements of the 
law on insolvency were such that this institutional clarity was a necessary 
facet of the English approach. Second, proprietary estoppel fulfils the 
need for a remedial doctrine. That proprietary estoppel is remedial is 
clear. In some cases, the court will award a purely personal remedy for an 
amount of money as in Jennings v Rice 89 where a payment of £200,000 
was ordered; whereas in other cases the court will award a proprietary 
remedy as in Pascoe v Turner 90 and in Re Basham,91 where the transfer of 
the freehold in a house was ordered; or the court may order a mixture of 
items of property and payments of money to compensate for detriment 
suffered as in Gillett v Holt 92 where the claimant received the freehold of 
a cottage, an identified field and a sum of money. 
The principal limitation of proprietary estoppel is that it is available 
only where the claimant can demonstrate that there was a representation 
or assurance made to them on which they relied to their detriment.93 The 
existence of this three stage test — which must be satisfied before the 
estoppel is made out — demonstrates the transformation of a potentially 
broad remedial discretion into a narrower, weaker discretion by restricting 
it to cases which satisfy those three elements. 
What is apparent, however, is that there remains scope for remarkable 
flexibility in the remedies. That flexibility may be said to be taken to such 
extremes in some instances that it suggests a strong discretion. If that is 
so, there appears to be a division between a rational, needs-based equity 
and a genuinely creative equity. As an illustration of the needs-based 
equity, the Court of Appeal in Baker v Baker94 held that an elderly relative 
88. Westdeutsche, supra note 76. 
89. Jennings, supra note 42.
90. [1979] 2 ALL ER 945 (CA (Civ)).
91. [1986] 1 WLR 1498 (Ch (Eng)) [Basham]. 
92. [2000] 2 All ER 289 (CA (Civ)).
93. Basham, supra note 91; Thorner v Major, [2009] UKHL 18. 
94. [1993] 25 HLR 408 (CA (Civ)(Eng)).
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who would have been entitled to an equitable interest in a co-owned 
home should be awarded sufficient money to pay for him to acquire an 
annuity which would fund the nursing and residential care that he would 
need for the rest of his life. This humane judgment recognised that the 
needs of the parties superseded the dictates of property law. This was, 
perhaps, an example of strong discretion being used within the confines 
of the law on proprietary estoppel to achieve the sort of result that would 
be familiar to a family lawyer. That is, an outcome focused on the needs 
of the parties beyond the detail of their property rights. 
As an illustration of the latter, “creative” equity in Stallion v Albert 
Stallion Holdings (Great Britain) Ltd,95 the court was faced with a situation 
in which Mr Stallion’s first wife had been promised that she could occupy 
her former matrimonial home for the rest of her life provided that she 
did not contest her husband’s divorce petition. Thereafter, the first wife, 
the second wife and Mr. Stallion himself had cohabited (apparently 
harmoniously) in the property in London’s Waterloo district for some 
time before Mr. Stallion’s death. It was held that the first wife had made 
out the estoppel and that by way of remedy the first wife and the second 
wife should continue to cohabit in that property. The suggestion that 
the former wife and the current wife of a man newly dead should live 
together by court order is at first surprising. The two women seem to 
have cohabited harmoniously before. The judge had seen the parties at 
first hand and heard all of the evidence. The first wife had been made 
a promise on which she had relied to her detriment in not contesting 
the divorce petition and the concomitant re-marriage. The judge clearly 
felt that the needs of all parties could best be met by their continued 
cohabitation. The resolution of the issues is reminiscent of that sort of 
creative equity which is the currency of the family courts.
95. [2009] EWHC 1950 (Ch).
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IV. Equity: Confidences and Things of Conscience
A. The Obfuscation of the Equitable Roots of 
Confidence in English Law
Equity presents a way of thinking about legal disputes which is different 
from the common law. Equity has its own methodology — based 
historically on its maxims — of taking high-level principles and then, 
using precedent, applying them to specific factual situations. Typically, 
common lawyers are suspicious of this approach. What this suspicion can 
mean is that, in circumstances in which common law and equity overlap, 
the principles of equity are completely overlooked by common lawyers 
because the concepts used by equity have no meaning for them. A good 
example arises in relation to the English law on misuse of confidential 
information.96 
In England and Wales, there has been much excitement in recent 
years about the development of a tort of misuse of private information.97 
What is interesting is that the discussion among the common lawyers 
about the supposed brave new world of confidentiality has entirely 
overlooked three things: first, that there continues to be a very important 
doctrine of breach of confidence in equity; second, that the principal 
remedy sought in cases of this sort is an injunction based on equitable 
principles; and, third, that the principles which have led to the new tort 
of misuse of private information were based on an equitable “obligation 
in conscience”. 
In the Spycatcher98 litigation it was treated as settled law that the 
principle governing the action for breach of confidence was an equitable 
96. See Alastair Hudson, “Equity, Confidentiality and the Nature of Property”, 
in Helena Howe & Jonathan Griffiths, eds, Concepts of Property in 
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 
94-115.
97. Campbell v MGN Ltd, [2004] UKHL 22 at paras 13-14 (that is, the same 
Lord Nicholls who reorganised the principles of dishonest assistance in 
Royal Brunei, supra note 65). 
98. Spycatcher, supra note 24.
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“obligation in conscience” not to misuse confidential information.99 
What is interesting is that none of the common law commentators who 
have addressed this equitable root to the breach of confidence action100 
have identified what the equitable doctrine actually is. It is generally 
treated as being “obscure”101 or not “firmly established”.102 This approach 
overlooks the continued use of equitable injunctions throughout the 
history of this doctrine, even in relation to the tort of misuse of private 
information today. It also overlooks the ubiquitous description of breach 
of confidence as being based on an “obligation of conscience” in equity in 
cases such as Spycatcher and Douglas v Hello! Ltd.103 Nevertheless, common 
law commentators do not even mention the word “conscience” in their 
accounts, in spite of its continued use by the courts of England, Canada 
and Australia. As such, by overlooking the equitable doctrine, it has been 
suggested that the “modern action of confidence is of surprisingly recent 
vintage”.104 One is minded to say that it would appear to be of surprisingly 
recent vintage if one focuses exclusively on surprisingly recent cases and 
ignores the use of equitable concepts even then. 
The reason for this omission is that conscience simply forms no part 
of the common law canon. Just as a military historian discussing the 
Spanish Civil War might overlook developments in Andalucian cuisine as 
being of no importance in their work, a common law specialist does not 
see the need to discuss the idea of “conscience”. The point here is a simple 
one. Common lawyers are so antipathetic to the idea of conscience as a 
legal category that they ignore the word “conscience” and its derivatives 
completely. Whereas the concepts of conscience and unconscionability 
are central to equity, they are constantly overlooked when intellectual 
property lawyers and common lawyers discuss concepts like confidence.
99. Ibid at 281 (per Lord Goff) and at 255 (per Lord Keith).
100. See e.g. Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry’s Law of Confidence, 2d (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) [Aplin], Paul Stanley, The Law of Confidentiality 
(Oxford: Hart, 2008).
101. Aplin, supra note 100 at 12.
102. Ibid at 13.
103. [2007] UKHL 21. 
104. Aplin, supra note 100 at 13. 
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B. The Continued Rude Health of the Equitable 
Doctrine of Breach of Confidence
That the equitable doctrine of confidence is still alive and well in England 
is beyond question. In the Supreme Court decision in Vestergaard 
Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd105 in 2013, Lord Neuberger reminded 
us that the doctrine is equitable, that it is based on conscience, and that 
“in order for the conscience of the recipient to be affected, she must 
have agreed, or must know, that the information is confidential”.106 
Thus, conscience-based equity remains central here. His lordship also 
quoted Mr Justice Megarry as having held in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) 
Ltd 107 that “the equitable jurisdiction in cases of breach of confidence 
is ancient; confidence is the cousin of trust”.108 In 2011, the Court of 
Appeal in Tchenguiz v Imerman109 made it clear that a “claim based on 
confidentiality is an equitable claim … [and that accordingly] … the 
normal equitable rules apply”.110 It is strange then that the common 
lawyers continue to overlook these principles. No mention of the word 
“conscience” even appears in their accounts of this area. 
C. A Stronger Equity Outside England: the “Obligation 
in Conscience” in Spycatcher
Equity may well have had its roots in the oddities of English history but 
it seems to have grown deeper roots outside England. By way of example, 
the roots of the judgment of Scott J in Spycatcher were planted in large 
part in the judgments of Justice Mason in Commonwealth of Australia v 
John Fairfax & Sons Ltd 111 and of Justice Deane in Moorgate Tobacco Ltd 
105. [2013] UKSC 31.
106. Ibid at para 23. Moreover, it is said that “confidence is the cousin of trust” 
in this context because it is part of the ancient equitable jurisdiction on 
breach of confidence at para 22. 
107. [1969] RPC 41 (Ch (Eng)).
108. Ibid at 46.
109. [2010] EWCA Civ 908. 
110. Ibid at para 74. 
111. (1980), 147 CLR 39 (HCA). 
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v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2)112 to the effect that there is a “general equitable 
jurisdiction” to grant relief in relation to breaches of confidence. As it was 
put by Deane J: 
[l]ike most heads of exclusively equitable jurisdiction, its rational basis does 
not lie in proprietary right. It lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience 
arising from the circumstances in or through which the information was 
communicated or obtained.113
In the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Chief Justice Street held that the 
appropriate form of remedy is in the largest sense an in personam remedy 
in that a court looks to the conscience of the individual in deciding which 
remedy or doctrine, if any, is appropriate.114 These conceptualisations of 
the principles are in the grand tradition of equity and are signifiers of 
well-understood lines of precedent within equity. 
V. Branching Out: Law and Morality
A. Conscience, Unjust Enrichment, and Politics
The judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche115 reminded 
us that “conscience” is, and always has been, at the heart of trusts law 
in England and Wales as well as at the heart of equity. In particular, 
constructive trusts in the English law context are based on the idea that a 
proprietary constructive trust arises on an institutional basis by operation 
of law when the defendant has knowledge of some factor which ought 
to affect their conscience. The trust is therefore deemed to have come 
into existence at the moment when the defendant’s conscience ought 
to have been affected: that is, at the moment of acquiring the necessary 
knowledge of the factor in question. 
The debate which has ensued is due to a misunderstanding of 
what “conscience” involves. As outlined above, the commentators have 
chosen to treat the term “conscience” as being a purely technical term, 
and in consequence they have side-stepped the need to address complex 
112. (1984), 156 CLR 414 (HCA).
113. Ibid at 437. 
114. Spycatcher, supra note 24 at 152 (quoting Street CJ).
115. Westdeutsche, supra note 76. 
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questions as to the precise morality which might be capable of being 
enforced by the courts. This is the result of a postmodern turn in our 
jurisprudence: that is, we are reluctant to accept claims to “right” and 
“wrong” from anyone, even if (or possibly, especially if ) they are a public 
official appointed to sit in judgment over us. At conferences, one may 
even hear trusts law professors describe this sort of traditional equitable 
approach as being “just not thinking”. On that model, the only form of 
“thinking” is said to be the sort of taxonomy which has become popular 
among the English restitution school, borrowing a veneer of scientific 
rigour from the natural sciences in their use of the word “taxonomy”. 
The problem is that the taxonomies produced by natural sciences are 
observations of the way in which the real world is actually ordered; 
whereas the taxonomies produced by legal positivists are ideological in 
nature in that they create structures of the way in which they want the 
world to be. As Nietzsche put it, the greatest artists in abstraction are 
in fact the people who create the categories.116 That is, the purportedly 
value-free, apolitical rigour of taxonomic thinking actually conceals a 
deeply political, abstract project in law-making. That project is political 
in that judges are effectively being lobbied to change the law and in that 
the law is being remodelled to prefer the needs of commercial people over 
the rest of society by taking concepts and models from contract law in 
particular. 
Beyond that sort of rigidity, equity permits principled decision-
making and sensitive dispute resolution. The recent case law on bribery 
in England is a good example of this. 
B. Bribery
A simple moral problem arises when a person receives a bribe: should 
that person be entitled to profit from that bribe? That problem is simple 
because the clear answer, assuming no supervening circumstances, is that 
no one should be able to profit from the receipt of a bribe. Yet, courts have 
made heavy weather of the legal conceptualisation of that same question. 
116. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, (reprint of the 1901 edition)
(London: Doubleday, 2011) at 513.
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Under English law, when a person receives a bribe and invests that bribe 
successfully, it is apparently quite difficult to know whether or not that 
person should be entitled to keep those successful investments which 
were made with the bribe. The argument based on Lister & Co v Stubbs117 
and on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sinclair Investments (UK) 
Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd 118 (“Sinclair”) is that the recipient of 
the bribe (the false fiduciary) only owes their beneficiary a debt equal 
to the amount of the bribe. There would only be a constructive trust if 
the fiduciary had misused trust property to acquire for themselves an 
unauthorised benefit, but not if the fiduciary had taken a bribe from 
some third party which formed no part of the trust property. If the 
fiduciary had merely received a bribe then they would be permitted to 
keep the property acquired with the bribe and any profits taken from that 
property.119 This is simply morally wrong by any measure. A wrongdoer 
will have benefited from their wrongdoing. 
The principal reason given for permitting the false fiduciary to keep 
the bribe is that in cases of insolvency (as in Sinclair), unsecured creditors 
are elevated to the status of secured creditors by being granted proprietary 
rights under a constructive trust in the bribe and in any property acquired 
with the bribe. This, of course, begs the question whether or not there is 
always an insolvency in cases of bribery. The Court of Appeal was gulled 
into changing the law on constructive trusts in all circumstances relating 
to bribes because of arguments relating to insolvencies. 
It took the Federal Court of Australia in Grimaldi v Chameleon 
Mining NL (No 2)120 to bring the English courts back to reason in this 
context. As the Federal Court pointed out, the receipt of a bribe is an 
unconscionable act which would not give rise to a constructive trust after 
Sinclair, and therefore bribery would be an anomaly in the category of 
117. (1890), 45 Ch D 1 (CA (Eng)).
118. [2011] EWCA Civ 347. 
119. In practice, accounting for the amount of this debt which is equal in 
amount to the bribe received may involve selling the property acquired 
with the bribe, but that does not amount to a proprietary right in that 
property for the beneficiaries. 
120. [2012] FCAFC 6 (Austl). 
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unconscionable acts which give rise to constructive trusts in England and 
Wales. 
The Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious121 
(“FHR European Ventures”) reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Sinclair. In that case an agent had taken a secret commission from 
a vendor of land which meant that the agent agreed on behalf of its 
principal to acquire the land at a higher price than would otherwise have 
been required to be paid. It was held by Lord Neuberger, in imposing 
a constructive trust, that it was important to prevent the harm that is 
caused by bribery and by undisclosed commissions in commercial life. 
There is also a passing reference to the role of equity being to mitigate the 
rigour of the law; but there is no mention of conscience. 
The fortunate outcome of this change in direction in the law was that 
the moral question was aligned with the legal analysis: a wrongdoer may 
not benefit from their wrongdoing, and therefore a false fiduciary may not 
resist a proprietary claim to the bribe and thus to any property acquired 
with that bribe. Nevertheless the precise reasoning of the Supreme Court 
in FHR European Ventures is not entirely satisfactory. 
It is worthwhile taking a while to re-examine the judgment of 
Lord Templeman in Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid122 (“Reid”) 
where his lordship was clear in predicating his judgment imposing a 
constructive trust over a bribe on the idea of conscience. There were two 
equitable roots in this judgment. First, the idea that the taking of a bribe 
is unconscionable. Second, the idea that equity looks upon as done that 
which ought to have been done and therefore, because the bribe should 
have been given to the beneficiary on its receipt, equity would treat 
property in the bribe as having passed to the beneficiary immediately 
on its receipt.123 The basis for this constructive trust was that the receipt 
of the bribe was simply wrong. In that case, the receipt of a bribe by 
the Director of Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong was considered to 
be corrupt, in common with all bribery. Bribery was described by Lord 
121. [2013] EWCA Civ 17 [FHR European Ventures]. 
122. [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC (NZL)) [Reid].
123. The beneficiary in that instance would be territory over which Reid was 
the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
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Templeman as being “an evil practice”. A robust attitude to the moral 
questions looms large in that judgment. Moreover, the further principle 
established by Lord Templeman that the fiduciary must account for any 
reduction in the value of the property acquired with the bribe, as well 
as holding that property on constructive trust, suggests an element of 
retribution as well as restitution. 
The principal difference — and it is a very important difference — 
between the judgment of Lord Templeman in Reid124 and the judgment 
of Lord Neuberger in FHR European Ventures125 is that Lord Templeman 
based his judgment on the idea of conscience whereas the Supreme Court 
in the latter case found a constructive trust, notionally in line with the 
judgment in Reid, but without mention of the concept of conscience. 
Without the idea of conscience, it is more difficult to understand why 
there is a constructive trust in relation to bribery. With the moral centre 
of a conscience-based equity restored, it becomes clear again why a 
constructive trust encompasses cases of bribery as well as cases of conflicts 
of interest, cases of theft, and so forth. By re-establishing conscience as 
the moral centre of this area of law, it becomes clear that the constructive 
trust is being imposed so as to prevent the immoral earning of a profit 
from a bribe. The wrong is the corruption and the breach of fiduciary 
duty. The constructive trust is imposed so that no benefit is taken from 
that wrong and because equity looks upon as done that which ought to 
have been done.
VI. Trusts of Homes
A comparative account of the different approaches to unconscionability 
would show how the Commonwealth turned its back on England in 
relation to a particularly important area of law — the ownership of the 
home — when English law adopted the “common intention constructive 
trust”.126 This form of constructive trust was artificial at its heart: the 
purported “common intention” is often supplied by the court127 and 
124. Reid, supra note 122.
125. FHR European Ventures, supra note 121.
126. Gissing v Gissing, [1971] AC 886 (HL).
127. Oxley v Hiscock, [2004] EWCA Civ 546.
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therefore is not in fact the parties’ own intention. The House of Lords 
in Lloyds Bank v Rosset,128 motivated by the prospect of a slew of open-
textured rule-making, introduced a two-tier form of constructive trust 
resonant of the common law of contract. Rights could only be acquired 
by express agreement coupled with (usually) financial detriment or 
by contribution to the purchase price or mortgage repayments. The 
more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott129 has 
acknowledged these difficulties and decided that, when a common 
intention cannot be found, then the court can look to what is “fair”. In 
that regard, they have caught up with the law in New Zealand nearly 
twenty years after they had followed Lord Denning’s lead.130 The standard 
of “fairness” is undefined and it will take many years of judicial decision-
making for us to see it take shape, to criticise that shape, and for it finally 
to adopt a recognisable form. 
In Canada, the principle of unjust enrichment in ownership of the 
home — with its wilfully modern attitude to the rights of women and to 
the general avoidance of injustice in the ownership of the family home131 
— contrasts so starkly with the Oxford restitution school’s rigid model 
of “unjust enrichment” as to be remarkable. English unjust enrichment 
has nothing to say about family law nor about the home. Its taxonomic 
focus is on areas abutting contract law and commercial law, together with 
its grids of numbered categories of claim.132 While Oxford restitutionists 
call for the end of equity, they have nothing to say about the law on 
injunctions, ownership of the home, or those areas of law where high-
level principles are used to guide decision-making. Their project, for all 
its sound and fury, is actually quite narrow. The “equity” they seek to 
excise is merely a branch of a much larger tree. 
In Australia, where equity has always seemed to be at its strongest, 
the principle of unconscionability in the ownership of the home reflects 
128. [1991] 1 AC 107 (HL).
129. [2011] UKSC 53. 
130. Gillies v Keogh, [1989] NZCA 168. 
131. Pettkus v Becker, [1980] 2 SCR 834; Sorochan v Sorochan, [1986] 2 SCR 
38; Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980.
132. See Hedley, “Taxonomy”, supra note 22 at 151.
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a pure form of equity. The court considers the parties’ relationship and 
considers whether it would be unconscionable to award or deny rights in 
the family home between them.133 There is a principle at its heart which 
is concerned to observe Aristotle’s requirement that formal land law rules 
should not permit injustice in individual cases. The idea of conscience 
that accompanies this doctrine has been developed in the cases. It has 
a generally moral project at its heart: to prevent the continuation of an 
unfairly gendered system in which one part of society tended to acquire 
property rights at the expense of the contributions of any other part of 
that society. There are no confusions in an equity of this sort. It is simply 
about preventing an identified form of unconscionable activity. 
VII. Conclusion
As Hamlet noted, nothing is either good or bad but rather thinking makes 
it so. The same is true of equity. Thinking that law must always involve 
hard-and-fast rules makes equity seem bad; but hard-and-fast rules will get 
us only so far in a world in which aeroplanes are flown unexpectedly into 
tall buildings, in which the entire financial system is able to crash without 
anyone anticipating it, and in which large parts of the world continue to 
be at war on the basis of religious denomination. Rigid systems cannot 
serve all of our needs in the modern world because unanticipated events 
will require us to be able to react quickly and to create novel solutions for 
novel circumstances. That is precisely what Aristotle had in mind when 
equity appeared in his Ethics. Moreover, human beings continue to be 
held in thrall by “big picture” ideas like god, and intangible ideas like 
financial instruments, the internet and the metaphysical concept of hope. 
Equity and the idea of conscience fit exactly into this world of big picture 
ideas. In a world that is constantly changing there is obviously a need for 
stable moorings, and the law is an essential part of ensuring that there are 
some things which will last forever, but there is also a need for the courts 
to be flexible. The world was unpredictable in the sixteenth century and 
it still is today. 
Pinocchio is exhorted always to let his conscience be his guide. In 
133. Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1988), 62 ALJR 29 (HCA). 
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the Disney version of the story, he has to “give a little whistle” to call his 
conscience to him. In the Freudian version, the conscience is always there, 
monitoring the conscious mind. It comes unbidden. It is this internal 
monitor which the earliest Lords Chancellor had in mind when they 
created a system of principles based on Aristotle’s Ethics. They identified 
a growing need for a moral core to the law which would be proof against 
the tricks and contrivances which had become the workaday tools of even 
medieval lawyers. Over time, with the efforts of Lords Nottingham, Eldon 
and Hardwicke, many of these moral maxims have hardened through 
precedent into predictable rules and principles. Parts of express trusts 
law resemble contract law as much as anything else. And yet, akin to the 
methodologies of family lawyers and regulation specialists, there is still 
a vast terrain in which equity operates to find just outcomes using only 
a weak discretion. What this open-textured idea of a conscience-based 
equity means is that the legal system is fulfilling a part of its function to 
set out a code of moral principles alongside its rules. Consequently, we 
have a little more to go on when our consciences trouble us than simply 
to “give a little whistle”.
